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Abstract 
Anecdotal evidence from the British Railway Mania and other historical 
financial bubbles suggests that many investors during such episodes are 
naive, thus contributing to the asset price boom.  Using extensive investor 
records, we find that very few investors during the Railway Mania can be 
categorized as such.  Some interpretations of the Mania  suggest that naive 
investors were expropriated by railway insiders, but our evidence is 
inconsistent with this view as railway insiders contributed substantial 
amounts of capital, and their investments performed no better than those 
made by other experienced investors.   
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Who invests during asset price bubbles?  Anecdotal evidence from historical bubbles 
suggests that investors during such episodes are inexperienced, amateurish, naive, and 
even impecunious.
1
 However, there have been few academic studies on the 
characteristics of investors during such periods.
2
  In this paper, we examine the naivety 
and possible expropriation of investors during the British Railway Mania of the mid-
1840s.  According to Charles Mackay, writing in the 1856 edition of his book, this 
episode was at the time the greatest example of a financial mania in history, a view 
which, despite several prominent bubble-like episodes since, is still held today.
3
  The 
Railway Mania is regarded as such because of the more than one thousand railway 
companies that were established in 1844–46 accompanied by a substantial reversal of 
railway stock prices.     
The anecdotal evidence regarding investor characteristics during the Railway 
Mania is similar to that for other bubble-like episodes.  William Makepeace Thackeray’s 
satirical poem The Speculators, as well as the satirical press from the time, suggests that 
the naive and impecunious were heavily involved as investors during the Mania.
4
  Others 
allude to the participation of inexperienced investors such as widows and clergymen,   
and the large role played by the middle class, with the implication being that they were 
amateur investors who lost heavily.
5
  Indeed, it is even suggested that the clamor for 
railway shares by naive and inexperienced investors contributed to the creation of the 
Railway Mania itself.
6
  Some commentators have suggested that asset price bubbles are 
part of an attempt by insiders to expropriate these amateur investors.
7
 This would imply 
that during such an episode, both experienced insiders and inexperienced outsiders 
participate in stock trading, but high returns are earned by the former at the expense of 
the latter.  This paper investigates these issues by addressing two main questions.  First, 
how much knowledge and experience did investors have during the Mania?  Second, how 
did investments made by different types of investors perform?   
We use four measures of investor knowledge and experience. Firstly, the 
occupation of investors is used as a proxy for their knowledge of business and the 
political process. Secondly, past investment activity is used as a measure of their 
experience with the stock market. Thirdly, as railways were focused in particular 
geographical districts, we consider whether investors had knowledge of the locality. 
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Fourthly, we examine railway insiders, who were either directors of established railways, 
or who were on the provisional committees of the projected railways. 
Our main data sources are the lists of individuals who subscribed to new railway 
companies, and shareholder lists of one of the established railways, the Great Western 
Railway.  Both of these sources provide information on the occupation and location of 
investors. We also use contemporaneous shareholder lists from the banking sector to 
ascertain the extent to which railway investors were novices.  Finally, we use stock price 
data to determine whether or not certain investor characteristics were correlated with 
first-day investment returns and long-run success.  
We find that experienced investors contributed a large proportion of capital. 
Businesspeople, investors with previous investment experience, investors from the 
railway’s locality, railway directors and provisional committee members were all active 
in providing capital. In terms of investment performance, our evidence suggests that 
businesspeople and investors from the railway’s locality invested in projects which had 
higher returns, whereas inexperienced investors tended to invest in projects which 
provided lower returns.  Investments made by railway insiders did not perform as well as 
those made by other experienced groups, which may partially absolve them of acting in 
an opportunistic way during the Mania. 
One of the broader implications of this paper is that the role played by 
inexperienced investors during asset price booms may not be substantial.  This implies 
that we have to look elsewhere for the causes of asset price booms, and we cannot 
dismiss such periods as simply being the product of irrationality and naivety. Our 
findings also imply that bubbles are not necessarily an attempt by insiders to expropriate 
others. The biggest winners during the Railway Mania were those with experience, rather 
than inside knowledge, and attempts to hold insiders culpable for the development of a 
bubble may be misplaced.  
As well as adding to our knowledge of investors during asset price booms, this 
paper augments the growing literature on investor characteristics in the Victorian equity 
market.
8
  Although we know quite a lot about bank investors across the nineteenth 
century, our knowledge of railway investors is largely confined to the pre-Mania period.
9
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The Railway Mania and the Primary Market for Railway Shares 
The first modern passenger railway in Britain, the Liverpool and Manchester 
railway, opened in 1830.  Following its success, new railway companies were promoted 
during the mid-1830s, with Parliament authorizing fifty-nine new railways, having about 
£36.4 million of capital.
10
 After this flurry of activity, railway promotion was effectively 
dormant until 1843.  In 1843, there were sixty-three applications to Parliament, followed 
by 199 applications in 1844, and by the end of 1845 there were another 562 
applications.
11
 In addition, there were many projected companies that did not even reach 
the point of applying to Parliament, with The Times estimating that there were 1,263 new 
projects in 1845.
12
  
This boom in promotional activity was accompanied by a substantial run-up and 
collapse of railway stocks.  As can be seen from Panel A of Figure 1, the index of railway 
stocks peaked at 1,984 on 8 August 1845, and stayed close to that level for two months 
(all figures and tables can be found in the appendix at the end of the article).  It then fell 
to 1,623 by the end of November 1845, and reached a low of 673 on 19 April 1850. As 
shown in Panel B of Figure 1, the returns to established railways (i.e., railways that had 
been operating before 1843) and the returns to new railway companies excluding the first 
day that the share was traded on the market, are similar. The greatest gains went to those 
who had subscribed for shares when the company was first being promoted, before it 
obtained a stock market listing, as shares often rose to a premium as soon as they were 
listed on the secondary market. The compound effect of subscribing to all new companies 
which eventually obtained a stock market listing is shown in Panel B of Figure 1. 
If a group of individuals wanted to set up a railway company, they had to deposit 
a detailed application for a railway Bill with parliament in the November prior to the 
parliamentary session.  Part of the parliamentary submission included a subscription 
contract, containing the names, addresses, and occupational details of shareholders who 
had paid up 10 percent, and who had jointly undertaken to provide 75 percent of the 
company’s capital.13   
To attract investors, promoters would issue a prospectus, usually in the press, and 
invite applications to be made.
14
   These prospectuses generally contained details 
regarding the amount of capital being raised, the deposit required, members of the 
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provisional committee, the proposed route, the advantages of the scheme, and lists of 
stockbroker offices where applications for shares could be made.
15
   
Applicants in the 1840s usually had to provide a reference as to their standing 
along with their application.
16
  If an application was successful, shares were then allotted 
(or allotted on a pro rata basis in the case of oversubscription) to applicants.  At this 
point, they had to pay the 10 percent deposit on the shares, and in return they received a 
scrip certificate—this entitled the bearer to a stipulated number of shares if the company 
successfully obtained a Bill and was incorporated.  The original allottees were liable for 
all future calls should the company be successfully incorporated, and before that time, 
they were liable unlimitedly for all debts incurred by the company.
17
 
Although scrip certificates could not be legally traded, an active market arose for 
railway scrip because certificates were made out to bearer and could therefore be easily 
transferred without fear of legal penalty.
18
  However, original holders of scrip may have 
been reluctant to sell their scrip as they remained legally liable for all debts of the 
company until it was incorporated.
19
  In addition, the buyers of scrip were in a dubious 
legal position if they wanted to recover losses from the promoters.
20
 
  
Data on Investors during the Mania 
One of the key features of the Mania was the promotion of over one thousand new 
railway lines, so the examination of who subscribed the initial capital for such projects 
can give a particularly useful insight into who made the promotion boom possible. The 
absence of most extant shareholder lists and share registers also means that subscription 
contracts are one of the only sources of information we have on who invested during the 
Mania.
21
  Indeed, in the case of the Railway Mania, it has been suggested that 
subscription contracts may provide a greater insight than shareholder records into the 
“fever of speculation which gripped the middle classes in 1845.”22   
One potential weakness with subscription lists is that the majority of subscribers 
could have quickly sold their scrip or shares to others during the Mania, and it is really 
these buyers who we should be interested in if we want to understand who invested 
during the Mania.
23
  However, it was well known at the time that those who made the 
largest profit during the Mania were subscribers rather than those who purchased shares 
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on the secondary market.
24
 In addition, railway directors, who essentially allotted shares, 
may have had a preference for permanent investors rather than temporary speculators.
25
   
In April 1845, Parliament printed an alphabetical list of subscribers to railway 
schemes along with their description, addresses, railways they had invested in, and the 
amount of capital they had subscribed.
26
  This list is 539 pages long, and contains all the 
subscribers to 209 railway contracts that had been deposited in the year before November 
1844.  Similarly, in April 1846, Parliament printed a list of all persons who had 
subscribed £2,000 or more to any railway subscription that had been deposited in the year 
before November 1845.
27
  This list is 320 pages long and contains subscribers of £2,000 
or more to 556 railways.  In other words, between the two subscription lists, we can 
identify all those who subscribed to new railway ventures in the run-up phase of the 
Mania, and all large subscribers who invested whenever the Mania was close to or at its 
peak.       
The two parliamentary lists of railway subscribers were criticized at the time 
because it was alleged that they contained fictitious characters, placed there by the 
promoters to increase the respectability of the subscription list, and impecunious stags 
who applied for shares in new railways using false addresses.
28
 However, periodicals at 
the time did not question their authenticity.
29
  More importantly, a parliamentary report 
into the subscription list of the London and York Railway found that out of 1,101 
subscribers, only four were fictitious in that the subscriber had given a false address, 
name or socio-occupational description.
30
 The parliamentary committee’s conclusion was 
that the petitioner (a vice-chairman of a rival railway) was vexatious, and was simply 
interested in hindering the progress of the London and York railway through 
parliament.
31
  Notably, the aspersions he cast resulted in the London and York railway 
not being authorized by Parliament.
32
  Consequently, one would assume that subscription 
lists (particularly companies authorized by Parliament) did not contain too many 
fictitious or fraudulent individuals as such weaknesses could be used by opponents to 
prevent a railway company being authorized by Parliament.
33
             
It is highly unlikely that nominees were numerous in the subscription lists as it 
was a costly and sophisticated legal device out of the reach of most individuals.
34
  For 
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example, the inquiry into the subscription list of the London and York railway suggests 
that only five subscribers out of 1,101 may have been nominees.
35
 
A further potential problem with subscription lists as an information source is that 
they may reveal more about the preferences of promoters for a reputable as well as local 
shareholder body rather than the preferences of investors per se.
36
 Although there is not 
much evidence of favoritism on the part of promoters, they may have wanted to ensure a 
reputable and local shareholder body so as to convince parliamentarians of the merits of 
their proposal.
37
 This may explain why subscribers had to provide their socio-
occupational status as well as a reference when applying for railway shares.
38
 However, 
the providing of references became little more than a matter of form during the Mania.
39
  
In addition, such was the number of railway schemes before Parliament that close 
scrutiny of subscriber lists would have been very costly.  Indeed, it has been observed 
that the success of schemes had more to do with luck rather than anything intrinsic about 
the scheme or the list of subscribers.
40
  
                                  
Business and Political Experience 
To assess whether investors were experienced in business, or had superior 
knowledge of the Parliamentary authorization process for railway schemes, we examine 
the occupations of investors, using the description given in the Parliamentary subscription 
lists. We acknowledge that occupational status may be a blunt tool for determining 
experience as some women investors or others we classify as being inexperienced may 
have been very knowledgeable, and some individual businesspeople or railway directors 
may have had little business understanding as such. However, on average, we believe that 
occupational categories are reasonably good indicators of experience, and contend that it 
is useful to place investors on a spectrum with regards to their experience of business and 
politics based on their occupation.
 41
     
Although an individual may have exaggerated their status, it was in the self-
interest of railways to ensure that it was accurately reported.  A small proportion of 
investors do not have an occupational description, and in the very small number of cases 
where there is joint ownership, the occupation of the first-named investor was recorded.  
Many of the occupational categories are self-explanatory, but several occupations were 
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grouped into broader categories.
42
  Many investors were described as gentlemen or 
esquires in the Parliamentary lists; these were mainly unoccupied men living off rental 
income.  Although these titles may have been courtesy ones, it is unlikely that 
unoccupied men who were not from this social class were automatically labeled as such: 
the inclusion of investors in the lists with no description would suggest that this was not 
the case.
43
  Women investors who reported an occupation or a noble social status were 
assigned to the relevant socio-occupational category.  Other women investors were self-
reported in the subscription lists as either widows or spinsters.  These self-designations 
tell us little about their social status, but they may indicate that these individuals were 
excluded from others means of financial support. 
Table 1 breaks down all subscribers in the 1845 and 1846 Parliamentary lists by 
occupation; the two lists are not directly comparable as the 1846 list only contains those 
who subscribed more than £2,000.  Table 1 reveals that clergymen and women, the 
stereotypical naive or inexperienced investors, make up a very small proportion of 
investors and contributed just 1.2 percent of capital during the Mania. In terms of naive, 
low-wealth investors, the skilled and unskilled working classes constitute less than one 
percent of investors and about 0.1 percent of total capital pledged during the Mania.  The 
non-business middle classes (i.e., professionals and white-collar investors), who were 
perceived by some as amateur investors, only constitute about 10 percent of investors, 
and contributed about 6 percent of capital.   
The experience of gentlemen, and members of the armed forces and nobility is 
somewhat debatable. They might have lacked dedicated business experience, but they 
may have had knowledge of managing their finances, and often would have been 
directors of companies. They were a major contributor of capital, providing 34.3 percent 
of total capital. 
Those with most experience of business would have been those involved in 
commerce and finance. Merchants made up 21.7 percent of investors, and provided 30.7 
percent of capital in total.  Manufacturers and retailers contributed a further 8.2 percent of 
capital. Although the financial interest constituted a relatively small proportion of 
investors, they contributed about 7.8 percent of capital during the Mania. This suggests 
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that individuals with considerable experience of practical business were keen to invest in 
new railway schemes. 
Given the obstacles that new railway projects needed to overcome to obtain 
Parliamentary authorization, it is also possible that investors with legal and political 
experience could be regarded as having relevant knowledge and experience.  In addition, 
solicitors often handled the business and financial affairs of clients.   Table 1 reveals that 
legal professionals contributed a sizable proportion of capital (7.8 percent).  Although 
legal professionals have been traditionally castigated for their part in the Mania in terms 
of their involvement in railway promotions, it appears that they were significant 
investors.
44
 Politicians, given their small population, are also well represented among 
railway investors during the Mania, with about one-quarter of all MPs investing in 
railway shares.  As well as having knowledge of particular schemes, MPs might have had 
an incentive to influence the fortune of particular schemes through Parliament. However, 
their ability to do so may have been limited by the fact that the committees who made the 
decisions on individual railway companies were to be composed of five members, each of 
whom had to sign a declaration that their constituents as well as they themselves had no 
personal interest in the railway.       
From Table 2, which examines those individuals who appear on the 1845 and 
1846 subscription lists as well as the top percentile of investors during the Mania, we can 
see that of the 12,549 individuals who invested near the peak of the Mania, only 3,248 of 
those had invested in the run-up phase.  However, these 3,248 individuals invested 46.6 
percent of the total capital during the Mania, averaging 5.7 investments in separate 
companies.  In other words, those individuals who invested in both phases of the Mania 
do not appear to be naive or inexperienced investors; rather they are major providers of 
risk capital.  Indeed, during the Mania, the majority of subscribed capital was 
concentrated in the top percentiles of the distribution.  For example, the top four 
percentiles of shareholders provided half the capital. The occupational status of the top 
percentile, who provided 31.3 percent of capital, can be seen from Table 2: 125 
merchants and 106 gentlemen alone subscribed 21.7 percent of the total capital during the 
Mania.   
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Taken as a whole, the view of the Mania that sees the bulk of capital being 
provided by many small naive investors is one that this evidence clearly contradicts. The 
most inexperienced groups of investors provided little capital, the upper classes who may 
have some experience contributed much more, whilst those experienced in business and 
finance provided the majority of capital. 
 
Prior Investment Experience 
Even if individuals were not directly involved in business, they may have had 
experience of investing in other stocks. Historical asset price booms have usually been 
associated with “individuals with little or no experience of the stock market investing for 
the first time.”45 With respect to the Railway Mania, it is traditionally believed that many 
individuals had never invested in equities before.
46
  To what extent were Mania investors 
novices to equity investment?  To answer this question, we use other contemporaneous 
shareholder lists.         
 At the time of the Mania, there were many other companies whose shares traded 
on public markets.  For example, apart from railways, in 1845 there were just over 150 
equity securities traded on the London Stock Exchange,  and stocks of 148 banks traded 
on the London and the regional stock exchanges.
47
 Fortunately, we have a list of all 
shareholders in Scottish banks in 1845.
48
 This list contains the name, description, and 
address of about 14,000 shareholders who held shares in the nineteen joint-stock banks in 
existence at that time; the vast majority of these shareholders (97 percent) lived in 
Scotland. 
To ascertain whether Mania investors were novices, we match all railway 
investors from Scotland with the list of Scottish bank shareholders.  The process of 
matching these two lists required that an individual have the same name, description, and 
address in both lists.  This approach results in a potentially large underestimation of the 
number of railway subscribers who were also bank shareholders because occupations in 
one list may have been specific whereas in the other they were generic; individuals with 
commonly-occurring surnames and descriptions (i.e., merchant or gentleman) whose 
address was just reported as Edinburgh or Glasgow have been excluded as we cannot 
determine whether or not they were the same individual;  it may have been commonplace 
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for businesspeople to give their business address in the list of bank shareholders and their 
home address in the subscription lists. 
Given the above underestimation problems, it is notable that 30.6 percent of 
railway subscribers who lived in Scotland were also holders of Scottish bank shares, and 
these individuals contributed 43.9 percent of total railway capital subscribed by Scottish 
investors.  The severity of the underestimation problem is illustrated by the fact that only 
45.2 percent of bankers who subscribed to railways held bank shares.  This is an 
extremely unlikely scenario as bankers typically held shares in their own banks. 
We also obtained shareholder records for the Sheffield and Hallamshire Banking 
Company, which enabled us to determine who had invested in its shares in the period 
from its inception in 1836 to 1845.
49
  This bank was one of three banks in Sheffield at the 
time, and was similar to other Sheffield banks in that there were very close links between 
it and industry, with the result that the Sheffield manufacturing and mercantile classes 
dominated the shareholding constituencies of these banks.
50
  Using the same matching 
approach as in the Scottish case above, we estimate how many individuals from Sheffield 
invested in railways and had invested in this bank between 1836 and 1845.  There were 
five hundred individuals from Sheffield who invested during the Mania, and ninety of 
these investors had invested in the shares of the Sheffield and Hallamshire bank.  These 
ninety investors subscribed 24.4 percent of railway capital in Sheffield.  These are 
remarkably high figures given that there were two other joint-stock banks in Sheffield.
51
  
In addition, shares in Sheffield banks were almost exclusively held by businesspeople, 
implying that a lot of non-business railway investors would have been excluded from 
holding them.
52
                              
We also ascertained which Great Western Railway (GWR) shareholders in 1843 
went on to subscribe to new railways during the Mania.  Our analysis suggests that 473 
GWR shareholders (23.5 percent) went on to subscribe to new railways and these 
investors contributed 3.6 percent of capital during the Mania.  As these investors would 
have had experience of how railways were constructed, financed, and operated, they 
cannot be regarded as naive or inexperienced. If a similar proportion of investors in other 
established railways went on to invest in new projects, the contribution of capital during 
the Mania by such individuals would have been substantial.    
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Consideration of each of these sources of previous investment experience 
suggests that a substantial proportion of investors had invested in the equity market prior 
to the Mania. This implies that these investors would have been familiar with the risk and 
returns that were associated with stock market investments.  
 
Knowledge Based on Geography 
Prior to the Mania, the important sources of railway capital were the Northwest 
(primarily Lancashire), London, and Yorkshire.
53
 One would therefore expect that 
investors residing in these regions had extensive experience of railway investment prior 
to the Mania as they had actually witnessed the success of railways in their locality.  As 
can be seen from Figure 2, the vast majority of investment during the Mania came from 
these three regions, with close to 60 percent of subscribed capital and over 50 percent of 
investors coming from these three regions.   
London becomes a slightly more important source of railway capital during the 
Mania than it had done beforehand, with 20.7 percent of Mania investors living in 
London.
54
  This may suggest that the capital market had become a national one, with 
investors naively giving funds to companies of which they had little knowledge.  
However, somewhat countering this, London investors, on average, invested more in 
railways than investors from other regions, with the result that 29.9 percent of subscribed 
capital was from London.
55
  Indeed, close to one-third of the top percentile of investors 
are from London, and these 110 investors subscribed one-third of total capital during the 
Mania, implying that the London elite were heavily involved during the Mania and not 
just after the market had reached its nadir.
56
   
Investors in local railways on the whole may have had more information than 
non-local investors.  Although some local investors may have invested for reasons of 
local pride, peer pressure or because of positive externalities, this does not mean that they 
did not care about (or have information on) the future financial prospects of the railway 
they invested in.  In order to measure the extent to which investors invested in railway 
projects in their local area, we ask whether or not an investor lived in the same county as 
one of the proposed railway’s termini.57  Such investment is classified as local 
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investment.  Termini for each railway were determined from the railway’s appellation 
and Carter’s Historical Geography of the Railways. 
A substantial number of shareholders invested in local companies during the 
Mania, with 34.7 percent of investments being made by shareholders living in the county 
of the railway’s termini. This may suggest that many investors chose to invest in 
companies about which they had superior local information.
58 
 The regional disparities in 
local investment in are noteworthy; over 49 percent of investors in Southwest England, 
Northeast England, large parts of Scotland, and South Wales invested in railways in their 
region.  In contrast, the majority of investors from London and the North-West did not 
invest in local railways, suggesting that the pattern established prior to the Mania of these 
two regions playing an important role in financing non-local railways continued during 
the Mania.  
These results confirm that a substantial proportion of investment came from 
regions which were established providers of capital, whilst another major proportion was 
local in nature. Both of these findings lend to support the view that many investors were 
not inexperienced in that they had relevant geographical knowledge and experience. 
 
Railway Insiders 
It could be argued that the strongest form of knowledge and experience would be 
possessed by those who could be regarded as railway insiders i.e., directors of established 
railways and members of provisional committees.  Although some insiders may have 
been delusional about the potential success of their railway scheme, on the whole this 
group would have had greater knowledge of schemes than other investors.  As 
information on insiders was not reported in the Parliamentary subscription lists, we 
obtained the directors of established railways from the 1845 Railway Directory and 
provisional committee membership was obtained from advertisements for new schemes 
in the Railway Times.  Although not every scheme in the Parliamentary subscription lists 
advertised in this periodical, we managed to find membership details for 196 schemes, 
covering 43.8 percent of investment in new railway schemes.   
As can be seen from Table 3, provisional committee members were substantial 
investors in schemes which they promoted as well as other schemes.  Provisional 
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committee members provided 18.5 percent of total capital in the railway schemes which 
they helped promote and 32.4 percent of total capital in all railway schemes.  On average, 
the investors in Table 4 were in 1.4 provisional committees and invested in 1.1 other 
railway schemes. 
 The majority of the 2,058 provisional committee members were merchants and 
manufacturers (36.0 percent) and gentlemen (31.7 percent).  Legal professionals, bankers, 
and politicians were also well represented on provisional committees.  Unsurprisingly, 
so-called inexperienced investors were not members of provisional committees, and 
members of the middle classes were not well represented either. 
Directors of established railways, who mostly were either businessmen or 
gentlemen, were substantial investors in new railway schemes, with many of them being 
amongst the top percentile of investors during the Mania.  Overall, directors of 
established railways contributed 15.3 percent of total capital during the Mania.  In 
addition, close to one quarter of directors who invested during the Mania were also on the 
provisional committees of new schemes. 
The above evidence suggests that a substantial proportion of funds for railway 
schemes during the Mania came from railway insiders, suggesting that a large proportion 
of investment came from individuals with extensive knowledge of the railway industry.  
In addition, the level of investments made by these insiders suggests that they did not act 
in an opportunistic fashion during the Mania as they had a major stake in the success of 
the new railway schemes.    
 
Investors and Investment Success 
In this section, we examine the relationship between investor characteristics and 
the performance of their investment in order to ascertain whether investor experience and 
insider knowledge translated into superior investment performance.  We measure 
performance by the price/par ratio enjoyed by a railway security on the first day it is 
quoted on the market.
59
  This measures the gain to the original subscriber as many of the 
first-day prices were for scrip rather than shares.  As can be seen from Figure 1, most of 
the return earned on new railway schemes was generated by its first-day return, 
suggesting that initial subscribers enjoyed the bulk of returns.  Indeed, a contemporary 
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investment expert highlighted the effect of first-day returns, suggesting that first-day 
returns of 100 percent were to be expected.
60
  
We measure long-run success of an investment in a railway by using the price/par 
ratio on the last day for which a security is quoted.  In essence, what we are attempting to 
measure with this variable is the success or otherwise of railway companies in the longer 
run.  Our basic premise is that less successful schemes will have lower price/par ratios on 
the last day its shares trade.  As the vast majority of railway companies established during 
the Mania were not independent companies by the end of the 1840s, this last price 
observation for most companies is the last price quoted before the company either 
merged with another company or leased its line to another company or was wound up.  
For the few companies that survived to 1850, we use the last price/par ratio of that year as 
a measure of long-run performance.   Even though the original investor may have sold 
their stocks at this point, we are essentially asking whether or not they invested in a 
railway that proved to be successful in the longer run.   
The price/par ratios were obtained from various issues of the Railway Times.  We 
then regress the investor characteristics for each individual investment on the first and 
last day price/par ratio for each individual investment.  We also control for the size of the 
investment, the fraction of capital called up, and the year the investment was made. 
As can be seen from Table 4, investments made by women and those who we 
categorize as inexperienced perform less well than those made by other investors.  In 
addition, investments made by the middle classes (professionals and white collar) and 
upper classes also perform less well than those made by other investors, but the 
coefficient on those variables is smaller than that on the women and inexperienced 
variables.
61
  Contrastingly, merchants, and the rest of the business class (manufacturers 
and retailers) made investments that performed better than those made by other investors, 
but investments made by investors from the finance sector perform no better or worse 
than those made by other investors.   
There is some evidence of those with legal experience earning higher returns but, 
apart from specification 9 in Table 4, which is based on a smaller sample, investments 
made by politicians do not perform any better than those made by other investors.  This 
would suggest that their knowledge of the authorization process did not necessarily 
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bestow them with greater insider information.  This finding would also appear to partially 
absolve MPs from claims that they acted in an opportunistic manner during the Mania.
62
   
The positive and significant coefficient on the local variable in Table 4 implies 
that investments made by local investors performed better than those made by non-local 
investors, suggesting that the superior information of local investors enabled them to 
invest in better performing railway stocks.  It also appears from Table 4 that large 
investors, proxied by the variable PortfolioValue, do not necessarily choose better 
performing investments.  However, the coefficient on the PortfolioNum variable suggests 
that an investment made by an investor who has invested in multiple railway schemes has 
a higher price/par ratio on the first and last day of trading.  This suggests that those who 
invested in multiple railway schemes had superior knowledge of what was a good 
investment.                             
As can be seen from Table 4, investments made by railway insiders (directors and 
chairmen of established railways as well as provisional committee members) had mixed 
success.  Investments made by directors tended to earn higher returns, but those made by 
chairmen did not. Those made by provisional committee members actually performed no 
better or worse than those of others. Taken as a whole, this evidence suggests the 
following.  First, provisional committee members did not act opportunistically and they 
did not necessarily have superior information than other investors.  Second, established 
railway directors did not make relatively larger short-term gains from their investments 
than others investors.  This is inconsistent with them being viewed as charlatans chasing 
short-term gain.
63
  An alternative explanation is that directors used their extensive 
knowledge of the industry to avoid investing in “bubble” companies that earned high 
first-day returns.         
Table 5 reveals the extent to which investor characteristics correlate with the 
long-run success of a new railway scheme.  On the whole, the results parallel those found 
in Table 4, with businesspeople being more likely than women and inexperienced 
investors to invest in railways which were more successful in the long run and local 
investors being more likely to invest in more successful railway schemes.  However, two 
interesting results emerge from Table 5.  First, provisional committee members were 
more likely to invest in railways which were less successful in the long run, which 
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implies that they did not have superior information than other investors, and they may 
even have invested for reasons other than earning a financial return on their investment.  
Second, directors of the established railways were more likely to invest in railway 
schemes that were more successful in the long run, implying that they had superior 
information on the long-run success of new railway schemes. 
 
Established Railways 
The results in the previous section are interesting in so far as they allow us to 
examine the relative success of investors in choosing between assets. However, during an 
asset price reversal it is also important to consider the relative performance of investors in 
choosing when they enter and exit the market. To investigate this issue, we analyze the 
shareholder records of the Great Western Railway (GWR), a large railway that had been 
authorized by Parliament in 1835 to construct a line between London and Bristol.   
This is the only company we were able to locate that had surviving records listing 
the identity of its shareholders at different points in time throughout the course of the 
Mania. It is also one of only a few railways which was not reorganized as a result of 
amalgamations, meaning the same classes of shares traded continuously during the 
period. Notably, as can be seen from Figure 1, the asset price reversal experienced by the 
GWR was similar to the market as a whole.  
The three shareholder lists that we analyze are the holders of £100 and £20 shares 
from February 1843, 1845, and 1848.
64
  Although the GWR also had £50 shares in this 
period, the shareholder records for this class in 1845 have not survived. Nevertheless, the 
holders of £100 and £20 shares constituted the vast majority of the company’s 
stockholders, and owned 72 percent of the company’s equity capital in 1845. 
Table 6 reveals that the profile of investors in the GWR is broadly similar to that 
found in the subscription lists of new schemes. The business and upper classes are again 
the biggest contributors, with gentlemen being relatively more important. There were, 
however, a higher proportion of women investors in the GWR compared to the new 
railways, and this proportion increased slightly over the course of the Mania.  However, 
these findings do not imply that GWR investors were inexperienced; it more likely 
reflects the fact that this railway was paying a dividend of eight percent in 1845, which 
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made it attractive to male and female rentiers.
65
  Consistent with this finding, a 
contemporary investment guide recommended that those looking for immediate income 
should invest on the established lines, whereas those looking for long-term capital gains 
should focus on the new railways.
66
 
The location of investors also follows a similar pattern to that of the new railways, 
with investors from London and Lancashire, and local investors from Gloucestershire, 
providing most of the capital.  
There is also evidence of railway insiders holding shares in the GWR. Using the 
Railway Directory to identify directors, we found that as well as each of the GWR’s 
fourteen directors holding shares in the company, directors of other railways also held 
GWR shares.  The numbers of railway directors holding shares in the GWR were as 
follows: forty-seven in 1843, forty in 1845, and thirty-four in 1848.   
By analyzing which investors were present in each of the years, it is possible to 
determine during which period individuals entered and exited their investments in GWR 
shares. Using share price and dividend data, this information can be used to determine 
which investors gained and lost from their investments.  
Indices of capital gains and total returns have been calculated to estimate the 
returns to GWR shareholders during the Railway Mania, as shown in Figure 1. The 
indices have a base of 1,000 in Feb. 1843. Share prices rose almost continuously 
thereafter so that at Feb. 1845, the total return index stood at 1,817.   Within the space of 
a few months, GWR stock prices then began to fall continuously so that at Feb 1848 the 
total return index stood at 1,102, and by March 1848 it had fallen to 979. 
The Feb. 1843 premium on GWR shares was at an all-time high since trading 
began in 1835. This means that it was likely that someone who held shares in Feb. 1843 
had paid less than the index level of 1,000. If they sold out prior to Feb. 1848 they had 
sold at a level above 1,000. Therefore, we define anyone holding shares in Feb. 1843 and 
who had sold by Feb. 1848 as a gainer.  Conversely, anyone who did not hold shares in 
Feb. 1843 had to pay more than the index level of 1,000. If they sold out after Feb. 1848, 
they are very likely to have sold for less than a level of 1,000. Consequently, anyone not 
holding shares in Feb. 1843, but who were holding shares in Feb. 1848 is defined as a 
loser.  We categorize those who were shareholders in both 1843 and 1848 as long-term 
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investors, and those who held shares in only 1845 as flippers.  We cannot say very much 
about the losses or gains of the latter, but the fact they flipped their shares may suggest 
that they were speculators.    
From Table 7, we observe at least five things of note.  First, there are many more 
losers than gainers, which is largely due to a large number of new shareholders 
purchasing GWR shares for the first time between 1845 and 1848.  Second, there are a 
relatively low number of flippers, perhaps suggesting that short-term speculators were in 
a minority.  Third, although all types of investors are present in the loser category, there 
are proportionally more women and inexperienced investors in this group.  Fourth, 
merchants and businesspeople are the two categories where there are more gainers than 
losers.  Fifth, the same holds true for investors from Lancashire.      
Table 8 contains the results of multinomial logit regressions where gainer is taken 
as the comparison or base group.  In essence, the coefficients show whether a variable 
made it more or less likely that an investor was in a particular group other than the gainer 
group. More specifically they reveal the impact that a change in an independent variable 
will have on the log of the ratio of the probability of being in a particular group compared 
to the probability of being in the gainer group. For example, the 0.413 coefficient on the 
women dummy variable in column 2 of Table 8 can be calculated and interpreted as 
follows. After controlling for other factors, for a woman (when the dummy variable 
equals 1) the probability of losing is 0.506, and the probability of gaining is 0.219, 
therefore the ratio of losing to gaining is 2.307, and the log of this ratio is 0.836. For a 
man (when the dummy variable equals 0) the probability of losing is 0.417, and the 
probability of gaining is 0.273, therefore the ratio of losing to gaining is 1.527, and the 
log of this ratio is 0.423. The impact of being a woman (when the dummy variable moves 
from zero to one) is calculated as the difference in the logs of the ratios, namely 0.836 
minus 0.423, which gives the coefficient value of 0.413. The significance of the 
coefficient indicates that we can be confident in the result, namely that being a woman 
increases the probability of losing rather than gaining. 
From Table 8, we see that women and inexperienced investors were more likely 
to be losers rather than gainers, whereas the reverse is true for merchants, the business 
classes, and the upper classes.  Although the coefficients on the Director variable in 
20 
 
specification two of Table 8 is negative on both occasions, only one coefficient is 
statistically significant, and it is only at the 10 percent level.  This suggests that railway 
directors were no more likely to be losers rather than gainers.  However, railway 
chairmen were significantly less likely to be losers, providing mixed results for the 
overall position of railway insiders. 
From both panels of Table 8 we see that investors from Lancashire and local 
shareholders were more likely to be gainers rather than losers.  This may suggest a level 
of investment astuteness on the part of shareholders from Lancashire and superior 
information on the part of local investors.  We also see that GWR investors who also 
invested in one of the new railway schemes were more likely to be gainers rather than 
losers. This might be because such investors sold their GWR stake to invest in new 
railways or it could indicate that GWR investors who invested in new railways were more 
experienced investors. 
   
 
 
Conclusions 
The anecdotal evidence for the Railway Mania does not deviate from the 
stereotypical view that investors during asset price booms are inexperienced and naive.  
However, our findings suggest that it would be an error to suggest that the Mania was 
driven by such investors. Using a range of measures, we find evidence that many 
investors were highly experienced. Although we do not directly address the issue of 
whether the Railway Mania was a financial “bubble,” our findings do not coalesce well 
with an interpretation of the Mania that argues that substantial investments by naive 
investors contributed to the asset price boom and bust.   
One potential explanation of the Mania is that inexperienced investors were 
expropriated by railway insiders.  Although we find evidence that investors with less 
experience tended to earn lower returns on their investments in new projects and were 
more likely to lose money during the downturn, we find no evidence to suggest that they 
were expropriated by railway insiders. Indeed, despite their access to power and insider 
knowledge, the investments of railway insiders performed no better than those made by 
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the business and middle classes.  This evidence appears to partially absolve these vested 
interests from acting in an opportunistic fashion during the Mania.            
All of this evidence raises a puzzle: why did so many people invest in railway 
shares given that they turned out to be a poor investment ex post?  One possibility is that 
there were insufficient outlets for a growing amount of savings, as the National Debt was 
not growing and there were few alternative investment assets.  Although this may have 
determined stock returns in the long run, it is unlikely to have caused the sharp reversal in 
railway stock prices in the mid-1840s.  Another possibility is that investors were simply 
riding the “bubble,” and hoping to get out before its eventual demise or before they had 
to pay calls on capital.  Another possible explanation could be that investors at the time 
were unaware that they were living through a period where new technology was being 
rapidly adopted, and as the probability of adoption increased, the rate at which cash flows 
were discounted increased, thus causing stock prices to fall.
67
  Notably, other famous 
“bubble” episodes such as the 1825 bubble in Britain, the U.S. case of 1928–29, and the 
dotcom episode of the 1990s have all been associated with concentrated investment in 
new investment opportunities.
68
  Another potential explanation is that there was political 
failure in that the UK Parliament, particularly in the autumn of 1845, did not ration 
railway schemes, and thus prevent wasteful competition.
69
  The effect of this political 
failure may have been to lower future cash flows, and hence railway stock prices.  Future 
research should attempt to test these various explanations.                   
The collapse of railway shares in the late 1840s resulted in great difficulties for 
railway companies who needed capital to expand and improve their network.  Investors 
were generally reluctant to fund smaller railways, and even larger entities had to innovate 
by issuing preferred stock and debentures to raise the necessary capital.  By the early 
1860s, the companies that were successful at doing this were producing the earnings that 
had been anticipated by investors in the 1840s, but even this was temporary, with railway 
profitability declining from the 1870s onwards.
70
  Consequently, a further area of 
research is the extent to which the Railway Mania affected the subsequent financing and 
development of British railways.   
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Table 1 
Railway Investors during the Mania 
   1845 Parliamentary list – the run-up phase  1846 Parliamentary  list – the peak of the Mania 
   % 
investors 
% capital Average no. 
investments 
Average value 
of investments 
(£)  
 % investors % capital Average no. 
investments 
Average value of 
investments (£) 
  Clergymen 0.9 0.6 2.0 2,161  0.4 0.3 1.5 6,631 
Inexperienced  Skilled working class 0.6 0.1 1.4 701  0.1 0.0 1.1 3,258 
  Unskilled working class 0.4 0.0 1.3 269  0.1 0.0 1.3 3,446 
            
Women  Spinsters 4.5 0.9 1.6 632  0.9 0.3 1.1 3,069 
  Widows 2.0 0.5 1.6 757  0.6 0.2 1.1 3,920 
            
Middle class  Professionals 4.8 3.1 1.9 2,214  5.2 3.8 1.5 7,066 
  White collar  6.7 2.8 1.7 1,401  4.0 2.3 1.4 5,518 
            
  Army & navy officers 1.6 2.5 1.9 5,301  2.0 2.0 1.9 9,830 
Upper class  Gentlemen 25.2 31.5 1.9 4,182  27.9 28.8 1.7 9,990 
  Nobility 0.7 2.0 1.9 10,247  1.5 2.3 2.0 15,044 
            
Merchants  Merchants 21.4 29.9 2.1 4,691  24.6 31.2 1.9 12,326 
            
Business  Manufacturers 9.3 5.9 1.9 2,153  7.7 6.5 1.7 8,208 
  Retailers 7.1 2.3 1.7 1,077  3.2 1.7 1.3 5,038 
            
Finance  Bankers 1.9 4.7 2.4 8,133  3.1 3.6 2.1 11,181 
  Other Finance 1.1 0.9 1.9 2,557  1.0 0.6 1.6 6,065 
  Stockbrokers 2.0 2.6 2.6 4,470  3.6 3.3 2.0 9,044 
            
Political  Politicians 0.3 1.0 2.3 10,577  1.2 3.1 3.2 25,974 
            
Legal  Legal professionals 6.3 7.4 1.9 3,951  10.2 8.0 1.7 7,626 
            
Other  Agriculture 2.6 0.6 1.4 815  1.4 0.7 1.3 5,053 
  Unknown 0.8 0.8 1.4 3,247  1.2 1.0 1.3 8,089 
            
  Total 24,844 £83.2m 1.9 3,349  12,533 £121.4m 1.7 9,693 
            
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on Return of Railway Subscribers, (P.P. 1845, XL) and Return of Railway Subscribers, (P.P. 1846, XXXVIII). 
Notes: The 1845 Parliamentary list includes investors who invested sums greater and less than £2,000, whereas the 1846 list only reports those who invested over 
£2,000.    
Table 2 
Large Investors during the Mania 
   Investors who invested in both the run-up and at the peak  The top percentile of investors during Mania 
   No. 
investors 
% capital in 
1845-46 
Average no. 
investments 
Average value 
of investments 
per investor (£) 
 No. 
Investors 
% capital 
in 1845-46 
Average no. 
investments 
Average 
value  
of 
investments  
per investor 
(£) 
  Clergymen 9 0.1 5.7 24,175  2 0.1 10.0 130,900 
Inexperienced  Skilled working class 1 0.0 3.0 15,000  0 - - - 
  Unskilled working 
class 
1 0.0 4.0 5,360  0 - - - 
            
Women  Spinsters 15 0.0 2.4 5,542  0 - - - 
  Widows 6 0.0 3.2 5,073  0 - - - 
            
Middle class  Professionals 158 1.1 4.8 14,842  5 0.5 5.6 184,845 
  White collar  100 0.6 4.6 12,714  1 0.1 4.0 170,000 
            
  Army & navy officers 53 1.1 6.2 43,771  8 0.9 13.8 228,372 
Upper class  Gentlemennn 852 13.6 5.7 32,621  106 9.3 13.3 179,708 
  Nobility 25 0.8 6.6 66,336  8 1.0 8.5 258,455 
            
Merchants  Merchants 988 17.0 6.1 35,270  125 12.4 13.3 202,922 
            
Business  Manufacturers 253 2.7 5.6 21,555  16 1.3 17.4 161,154 
  Retailers 96 0.4 4.5 9,172  3 0.2 4.7 112,927 
            
Finance  Bankers 146 2.3 6.3 32,190  20 1.7 11.9 172,126 
  Other Finance 28 0.2 4.9 11,940  1 0.1 1.0 150,150 
  Stockbrokers 124 1.3 6.6 21,157  5 0.3 17.6 130,393 
            
Political  Politicians 39 1.3 7.7 66,715  14 1.1 10.6 158,260 
            
Legal  Legal professionals 324 3.8 5.0 23,980  22 2.1 12.3 192,825 
            
Other  Agriculture 27 0.2 4.7 14,566  1 0.1 8.0 112,050 
  Unknown 3 0.1 7.0 48,478  5 0.3 4.6 141,297 
            
  Total 3,248 46.6 5.7 29,399  342 31.3 12.8 187,436 
            
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Return of Railway Subscribers, (P.P. 1845, XL) and Return of Railway Subscribers, (P.P. 1846, XXXVIII).  
Notes: Investors who invested in both the runup and the peak refers to those investors who appeared on subscription lists in both 1845 and 1846. The top 
percentile of investors refers to the top one percent of investors when they are ranked according to the total amount which they invested during the Mania. 
  
 
Table 3 
Investors during the Mania Who Were Also Provisional Committee (PC) Members 
     
Average no. of investments  
Average size of investment 
in each company (£) 
 
% of total capital in 1845 and 
1846 
   No. of investors  In firms in 
which was a 
PC member 
In all firms  In firms in 
which was a 
PC member 
In all firms  In firms in 
which was a 
PC member 
In all firms 
  Clergymen 8  1.3 2.1  3,826 7,942  0.0 0.2 
Inexperienced  Skilled working 
class 4  1.3 1.5  5,600 5,500  0.0 0.0 
  Unskilled 
working class 0  - -  - -  0.0 0.0 
             
Women  Spinsters 0  - -  - -  0.0 0.0 
  Widows 0  - -  - -  0.0 0.0 
             
Middle class  Professionals 81  1.3 1.8  3,966 3,488  0.5 0.6 
  White collar  43  1.4 2.0  3,941 3,915  0.3 0.4 
             
  Army & navy 
officers 61  1.3 2.4  4,318 4,526  0.4 0.7 
Upper class  Gentlemen 653  1.4 2.2  5,424 5,738  5.5 9.3 
  Nobility 63  1.3 2.3  6,344 5,840  0.6 1.0 
             
Merchants  Merchants 566  1.6 3.0  7,001 6,647  6.9 12.5 
             
Business  Manufacturers 174  1.3 2.3  4,972 4,812  1.2 2.1 
  Retailers 40  1.1 1.8  2,380 2,723  0.1 0.2 
             
Finance  Bankers 95  1.4 2.9  5,402 5,269  0.8 1.6 
  Other Finance 4  1.3 2.0  3,620 3,200  0.0 0.0 
  Stockbrokers 7  1.0 2.1  6,143 6,640  0.0 0.1 
             
Political  Politicians 80  1.7 3.4  5,819 5,264  0.9 1.6 
             
Legal  Legal 
professionals 127  1.4 2.3  5,692 4,891  1.1 1.6 
             
Other  Agriculture 26  1.3 1.7  2,674 2,918  0.1 0.1 
  Unknown 26  1.2 1.5  5,306 5,827  0.2 0.3 
              
  Total 2,058  1.4 2.5  5,728 5,677  18.5 32.4 
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on Return of Railway Subscribers, (P.P. 1845, XL), Return of Railway Subscribers, (P.P. 1846, XXXVIII), and 
various issues of Railway Times. 
Notes: The sample is restricted to railway schemes for which we have provisional committee data available.     
Table 4 
OLS Regressions: Investor Characteristics and First-Day Investment Returns 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
Inexperienced -0.140**    -0.214***   -0.290***  
 (0.066)    (0.066)   (0.071)  
Women -0.240***    -0.281***   -0.482***  
 (0.044)    (0.044)   (0.049)  
Middle class -0.090***    -0.100***   -0.197***  
 (0.024)    (0.023)   (0.027)  
Upper class -0.108***    -0.078***   -0.151***  
 (0.017)    (0.017)   (0.019)  
Business  0.242***    0.217***   0.383*** 
  (0.023)    (0.022)   (0.031) 
Merchant  0.106***    0.094***   0.169*** 
  (0.018)    (0.018)   (0.022) 
Finance  -0.033    -0.020   -0.041 
  (0.029)    (0.030)   (0.032) 
Politician  -0.051    0.066   0.152** 
  (0.061)    (0.065)   (0.073) 
Legal  0.012    0.057**   0.100*** 
  (0.028)    (0.028)   (0.033) 
Director   0.062  0.081 0.087*  0.113* 0.120** 
   (0.044)  (0.050) (0.050)  (0.059) (0.059) 
Chairman   0.104  0.119 0.126  0.068 0.079 
   (0.112)  (0.112) (0.112)  (0.128) (0.128) 
Prov. Comm.       0.025 -0.053 -0.038 
       (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) 
London    -0.155*** -0.125*** -0.111***  -0.140*** -0.118*** 
    (0.017) (0.018) (0.018)  (0.018) (0.018) 
Lancashire    -0.119*** -0.119*** -0.122***  -0.007 -0.010 
    (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)  (0.029) (0.029) 
Local    0.088*** 0.217*** 0.202***  0.416*** 0.399*** 
    (0.015) (0.016) (0.016)  (0.023) (0.023) 
InvestBoth4546     -0.030 -0.017  -0.038 -0.016 
     (0.020) (0.020)  (0.024) (0.024) 
PortfolioNum     0.017*** 0.018***  0.013*** 0.013*** 
     (0.002) (0.002)  (0.003) (0.003) 
PortfolioValue     -0.000*** -0.000***  -0.000 -0.000 
     (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Year1846     -0.427*** -0.414***  -0.214*** -0.195*** 
     (0.016) (0.016)  (0.018) (0.018) 
ShareValue     0.000 0.000*  0.000 0.000** 
     (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
ParMax     -3.377*** -3.391***  -3.190*** -3.226*** 
     (0.048) (0.048)  (0.068) (0.069) 
Constant 1.888*** 1.778*** 1.841**
* 
1.857*** 2.260*** 2.152*** 1.748**
* 
2.080*** 1.886*** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.007) (0.011) (0.018) (0.017) (0.009) (0.022) (0.019) 
          
Observations 28,951 28,951 28,951 28,951 28,043 28,043 20,061 19,782 19,782 
R-squared 0.002 0.005 0.000 0.005 0.094 0.095 0.000 0.085 0.089 
Notes: The dependent variable is the price/par ratio on the first day of trading of new railway schemes.  *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 robust standard errors in parentheses.  Inexperienced is a binary variable equal 
to one if the investor is skilled working class, unskilled working class or clergy; Women is a binary variable 
equal to one if the investor is a spinster or widow; Middle class is a binary variable equal to one if the 
investor is from the professional or white collar categories;  Upper class  is a binary variable equal to one if 
the investor is from the upper class; Business is a binary variable equal to one if the investor is a 
manufacturer or retailer; Merchant is a binary variable equal to one if the investor is a merchant; Politician 
is a binary variable equal to one if the investor is an MP; Finance is a binary variable equal to one if the 
investor is a banker, stockbroker or works in the financial sector; Legal is a binary variable equal to one if 
the investor is a member of the legal profession; Director is a binary variable equal to one if the investor is 
a railway director or secretary; Chairman is a binary variable equal to one if the investor is a railway 
chairman; Prov. Comm. is a binary variable equal to one if the investor is a member of the provisional 
committee; London is a binary variable equal to one if the investor resides there; Lancashire is a binary 
variable equal to one if the investor resides in that county; Local is a binary variable equal to one if the 
investor is from the county of the railway’s termini; InvestBoth4546 is a binary variable equal to one if the 
investor subscribes to railways in both the 1845 and 1846 lists; PortfolioNum is the number of different 
railways that an investor subscribes to; PortfolioValue is the total value of railway investments made by an 
investor; Year1846 is a binary variable equal to one if an investment is made in 1846; ShareValue is the 
value of the investment; ParMax is par value / nominal value i.e., fraction of capital which was called up. 
 
  
Table 5 
OLS Regressions: Investor Characteristics and Long-run Success 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
Inexperienced -0.135**    -0.175***   -0.279***  
 (0.052)    (0.053)   (0.070)  
Women -0.243***    -0.271***   -0.396***  
 (0.029)    (0.030)   (0.043)  
Middle class -0.111***    -0.111***   -0.178***  
 (0.018)    (0.018)   (0.025)  
Upper class -0.148***    -0.095***   -0.149***  
 (0.013)    (0.013)   (0.017)  
Business  0.242***    0.191***   0.359*** 
  (0.022)    (0.021)   (0.033) 
Merchant  0.148***    0.108***   0.154*** 
  (0.015)    (0.016)   (0.022) 
Finance  -0.033*    -0.028   -0.043 
  (0.020)    (0.020)   (0.027) 
Politician  -0.052    0.082   0.135** 
  (0.049)    (0.052)   (0.063) 
Legal  0.044**    0.078***   0.095*** 
  (0.022)    (0.022)   (0.029) 
Director   0.133***  0.128*** 0.132***  0.152*** 0.159*** 
   (0.039)  (0.043) (0.043)  (0.056) (0.056) 
Chairman   0.139  0.125 0.132  0.143 0.153 
   (0.102)  (0.100) (0.100)  (0.126) (0.126) 
Prov. Comm.       -0.090*** -0.087*** -0.075*** 
       (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) 
London    -0.054*** -0.006 0.004  -0.028* -0.010 
    (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)  (0.015) (0.015) 
Lancashire    0.096*** 0.072*** 0.070***  0.184*** 0.184*** 
    (0.021) (0.020) (0.020)  (0.027) (0.027) 
Local    0.164*** 0.196*** 0.184***  0.437*** 0.422*** 
    (0.013) (0.015) (0.015)  (0.023) (0.023) 
InvestBoth4546     0.055*** 0.065***  0.048** 0.069*** 
     (0.017) (0.017)  (0.023) (0.023) 
PortfolioNum     0.004** 0.004**  0.004* 0.005* 
     (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) 
PortfolioValue     -0.000 -0.000*  -0.000 -0.000 
     (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Year1846     -0.432*** -0.421***  -0.557*** -0.541*** 
     (0.012) (0.012)  (0.016) (0.015) 
ShareValue     0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000*** 
     (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
ParMax     -1.628*** -1.639***  -2.503*** -2.537*** 
     (0.048) (0.048)  (0.075) (0.076) 
Constant 1.081*** 0.945*** 1.019*** 0.960*** 1.231*** 1.118*** 1.112*** 1.415*** 1.236*** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.014) (0.012) (0.009) (0.020) (0.017) 
          
Observations 28,951 28,951 28,951 28,951 28,043 28,043 20,061 19,782 19,782 
R-squared 0.005 0.008 0.001 0.008 0.059 0.060 0.000 0.097 0.101 
Notes: The dependent variable is the price/par ratio on the last day of trading of new railway schemes.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 robust standard errors in parentheses.  Inexperienced is a binary variable 
equal to one if the investor is skilled working class, unskilled working class or clergy; Women is a binary 
variable equal to one if the investor is a spinster or widow; Middle class is a binary variable equal to one if 
the investor is from the professional or white collar categories;  Upper class  is a binary variable equal to 
one if the investor is from the upper class; Business is a binary variable equal to one if the investor is a 
manufacturer or retailer; Merchant is a binary variable equal to one if the investor is a merchant; Politician 
is a binary variable equal to one if the investor is an MP; Finance is a binary variable equal to one if the 
investor is a banker, stockbroker or works in the financial sector; Legal is a binary variable equal to one if 
the investor is a member of the legal profession; Director is a binary variable equal to one if the investor is 
a railway director or secretary; Chairman is a binary variable equal to one if the investor is a railway 
chairman; Prov. Comm. is a binary variable equal to one if the investor is a member of the provisional 
committee; London is a binary variable equal to one if the investor resides there; Lancashire is a binary 
variable equal to one if the investor resides in that county; Local is a binary variable equal to one if the 
investor is from the county of the railway’s termini; InvestBoth4546 is a binary variable equal to one if the 
investor subscribes to railways in both the 1845 and 1846 lists; PortfolioNum is the number of different 
railways that an investor subscribes to; PortfolioValue is the total value of railway investments made by an 
investor; Year1846 is a binary variable equal to one if an investment is made in 1846; ShareValue is the 
value of the investment; ParMax is par value / nominal value i.e., fraction of capital which was called up. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 6 
Great Western Railway Shareholders, 1843–48 
  
 
1843 
(%) 
1845 
(%) 
1848 
(%) 
  Panel A: Socio-occupational status 
     Clergymen 0.6 0.7 0.6 
Inexperienced  Skilled working class 0.6 0.6 0.4 
  Unskilled working class 0.5 0.5 0.4 
  
    Women  Spinsters 8.1 10.4 11.8 
  Widows 2.3 3.3 3.9 
  
    Middle class  Professionals 3.3 3.4 3.0 
  White collar  5.2 5.9 5.7 
  
      Army & navy officers 1.5 2.3 2.6 
Upper class  Gentlemen 48.5 46.1 43.4 
  Nobility 0.5 0.7 0.5 
  
    Merchants  Merchants 9.1 6.8 5.7 
  
    Business  Manufacturers 3.5 2.9 2.6 
  Retailers 4.7 3.7 3.1 
  
    Finance  Bankers 2.0 2.1 1.9 
  Finance 0.8 0.7 0.9 
  Stockbrokers 1.1 0.9 0.6 
  
    Political  Politicians 0.4 0.5 0.4 
  
    Legal  Legal professionals 2.5 2.7 2.9 
  
    Other  Agriculture 1.2 1.2 1.0 
  Unknown 3.4 4.5 8.7 
  
      Panel B: Location 
     London 24.1 25.3 24.9 
  Gloucestershire 17.8 15.3 14.3 
  Lancashire 16.1 14.6 12.1 
  Somersetshire 3.9 3.6 4.9 
  Other 38.0 41.2 43.8 
  
      Total number of shareholders 2,013 2,074 2,791 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Great Western Railway holders of £100 shares and £20 shares 
1843, 1845 and 1848 (National Archives, RAIL 251/28, 29, 32, 50, 52 and 54). 
  
Table 7 
GWR Investors during the Mania 
 
Long-term 
investors 
(%) 
Gainers 
(%) 
Losers 
(%) 
Flippers 
(%) 
Total no. of 
investors 
Panel A: Investor categories 
   
  
Inexperienced 22.9 27.1 34.3 15.7 70 
Women 14.6 19.2 55.5 10.7 625 
Middle class 22.6 21.8 40.3 15.3 385 
Upper class 17.8 28.3 41.0 12.8 2,203 
Business 26.2 34.2 31.3 8.4 275 
Merchant 24.0 36.2 28.3 11.5 304 
Finance 21.9 28.1 36.9 13.1 160 
Legal 14.6 23.8 48.5 13.1 130 
Politician 42.9 14.3 35.7 7.1 14 
Other/Unknown 8.6 15.6 61.8 14.0 385 
    
  
Panel B: Location 
   
  
London 12.9 27.5 44.9 14.7 1,201 
Gloucestershire 25.9 26.4 38.3 9.3 621 
Lancashire 23.3 35.1 31.9 9.8 615 
Somersetshire 21.6 20.0 50.0 8.4 190 
Other 16.8 22.9 46.7 13.5 1,924 
    
  
Total no. investors 824 1,189 1,967 571 4,551 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Great Western Railway holders of £100 shares and £20 shares in Feb. 1843, 
Feb. 1845 and Feb. 1848 (National Archives, RAIL 251/28, 29, 32, 50, 52 and 54). 
Notes: Long-term investors are those who held shares in Feb. 1843 and were still shareholders in Feb. 1848.  Gainers 
are those who held shares in 1843, but were not holding them in 1848.  Losers are those who were not holding shares in 
1843, but were shareholders by 1848.   Flippers are those who owned shares in 1845, but not in 1843 or 1848. 
Inexperienced refers to an investor who is skilled working class, unskilled working class or clergy; Women refers to an 
investor who is a spinster or widow; Middle class refers to an investor who is from the professional or white collar 
categories;  Upper class refers to an investor who is from the upper class; Director refers to an investor who is a 
director, secretary or chairman of an established railway company; Business refers to an investor who is a manufacturer 
or retailer; Merchant refers to an investor who is a merchant; Politician refers to an investor who is an MP; Finance 
refers to an investor who is a banker, stockbroker or works in the financial sector; Legal refers to an investor who is a 
member of the legal profession; London, Gloucestershire, Lancashire and Somersetshire refers to the location of an 
investor. 
Table 8 
Multinominal Logit Regressions Showing which Categories of GWR Investors Were 
More Likely to be Losers, Long-term Investors, or Flippers, rather than Gainers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Gainers Losers Long-term Flippers 
Panel A: Less experienced 
occupations 
    
Inexperienced  -0.415 0.159 0.134 
  (0.316) (0.354) (0.398) 
Women  0.413*** 0.110 0.085 
  (0.129) (0.167) (0.185) 
Middle class  -0.061 0.392** 0.278 
  (0.156) (0.178) (0.199) 
Upper class  -0.254*** -0.023 -0.161 
  (0.090) (0.109) (0.126) 
Director  -0.542 0.209 -0.925 
  (0.376) (0.328) (0.629) 
Chairman  -14.400*** -0.454 -14.431*** 
  (0.387) (0.713) (0.421) 
London  0.237* -0.718*** 0.479*** 
  (0.127) (0.150) (0.182) 
Lancashire  -0.800*** -0.139 -0.696*** 
  (0.118) (0.131) (0.168) 
Local  -0.394*** 0.262** -0.487*** 
  (0.118) (0.133) (0.172) 
GWRandNew  -0.544*** 0.100 -0.426*** 
  (0.101) (0.110) (0.140) 
ShareValue  -0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant  0.923*** -0.358*** -0.459*** 
  (0.091) (0.112) (0.124) 
Observations 4,551 4,551 4,551 4,551 
Panel B: More experienced 
occupations 
    
Business  -0.633*** -0.010 -0.638*** 
  (0.160) (0.169) (0.244) 
Merchant  -0.499*** -0.092 -0.143 
  (0.160) (0.169) (0.213) 
Finance  0.024 0.064 0.219 
  (0.212) (0.241) (0.282) 
Politician  1.136 1.683* 0.725 
  (0.846) (0.863) (1.248) 
Legal  0.356 -0.095 0.228 
  (0.231) (0.303) (0.315) 
Director  -0.629 0.158 -0.978 
  (0.384) (0.335) (0.632) 
Chairman  -15.867*** -0.905 -15.883*** 
  (0.536) (0.782) (0.579) 
London  0.056 -0.751*** 0.346* 
  (0.127) (0.150) (0.182) 
Lancashire  -0.689*** -0.142 -0.688*** 
  (0.119) (0.134) (0.169) 
Local  -0.282** 0.256* -0.418** 
  (0.119) (0.133) (0.172) 
GWRandNew  -0.502*** 0.105 -0.402*** 
  (0.103) (0.115) (0.146) 
ShareValue  -0.000** 0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant  0.899*** -0.299*** -0.458*** 
  (0.061) (0.076) (0.081) 
Observations 4,551 4,551 4,551 4,551 
Notes:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 robust standard errors in parentheses. Inexperienced is a binary 
variable equal to one if the investor is skilled working class, unskilled working class or clergy; Women is a 
binary variable equal to one if the investor is a spinster or widow; Middle class is a binary variable equal to 
one if the investor is from the professional or white collar categories;  Upper class is a binary variable 
equal to one if the investor is from the upper class; Director is a binary variable equal to one if the investor 
is a director, secretary or chairman of an established railway company; Business is a binary variable equal 
to one if the investor is a manufacturer or retailer; Merchant is a binary variable equal to one if the investor 
is a merchant; Politician is a binary variable equal to one if the investor is an MP; Finance is a binary 
variable equal to one if the investor is a banker, stockbroker or works in the financial sector; Legal is a 
binary variable equal to one if the investor is a member of the legal profession; London is a binary variable 
equal to one if the investor resides there; Lancashire is a binary variable equal to one if the investor resides 
in that county; Local is a binary variable equal to one if the investor lived in London or Gloucestershire; 
GWRandNew is a binary variable equal to one if the investor also subscribed to a new railway during the 
Mania; ShareValue is the value of the investor’s total investment in the Great Western Railway; Long-term 
investors are those who held shares in Feb. 1843 and were still shareholders in Feb. 1848.  Gainers are 
those who held shares in 1843, but were not holding them in 1848.  Losers are those who were not holding 
shares in 1843, but were shareholders by 1848.   Flippers are those who owned shares in 1845, but not in 
1843 or 1848. Pseudo-R2 for Panel A is 0.022, for Panel B is 0.023. 
 Panel A: Weekly indices of all railway shares,  
and Great Western Railway shares, 1843–50 
Panel B: Weekly indices of shares of established and  
new railway companies, 1843–50 
  
  
Figure 1. Market indices of railway shares, 1843–50. Sources for Panel A: The indices are calculated from daily stock price data in the Railway Times (1843-50).  
Dividend rates for the Great Western Railway were obtained from the Course of the Exchange. 
Notes: The market indices are weighted by market capitalisation. Great Western share price data is based on their £100 shares. Capital gains indices only include the 
returns from share price movements, controlling for changes in capital due to the effect of calls. Total return index also includes the returns from dividend payments in the 
week that they changed, according to the Course of the Exchange. 
Sources for Panel B: The indices are calculated from daily stock price data in the Railway Times (1843-50).  
Notes: Logarithmic scale. Market index of established railway companies weights the capital gains of companies established prior to the Mania (i.e., before 1843) 
according to market capitalisation. Market indices of new railway companies weights the capital gains of new railway companies, projected after 1843, assuming that 
investors rebalanced their portfolios each week to include all new railway companies according to their market capitalisation if they were already listed on the secondary 
market prior to that week, and according to their par value if they had not been previously listed on the market. The first-day return is calculated as the return to an 
investor when an asset is first traded on the market, if the investor had subscribed to the asset in the primary market at its par value. New railway indices begin in January 
1844 when the first new railway company was listed on the market. All indices have a base of 1,000 in January 1844. 
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Figure 2. Geographical sources of investment during the Mania. Sources: Authors’ calculations based on 
Return of Railway Subscribers, (P.P. 1845, XL), Return of Railway Subscribers, (P.P. 1846, XXXVIII). 
